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"SIR, YES, SIR!": THE COURTS, CONGRESS, 
AND STRUCTURAL INJUNCTIONS 
DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS 
WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT. By Ross 
Sandler1 and David Schoenbrod.2 Yale University Press. 
2003. Pp. 288. $30.00 
Mark Tushner 
This is a deeply confused book. Not that the authors' stance 
is unclear: They have seen federal courts in action, and they 
don't like what they see. Their subject is federal judicial supervi-
sion of state and local governments through injunctive decrees. 
The authors' position wouldn't be confused-or at least would 
be confused in a different way-if they dealt with injunctive de-
crees aimed at enforcing what the judges took to be constitu-
tional requirements. In such cases there's at least something co-
herent that can be said about judges displacing democratic 
decision-making. 
Sandler and Schoenbrod, though, don't deal with constitu-
tional cases. Their concern is judicial enforcement of federal 
statutes, such as the Clean Air Act and the Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act. As they say in their preface, "In 
most cases, Congress had enacted a law that told federal judges 
to enter decrees against state and local governments, or the state 
and local officials had consented to the entry of the decree 
against themselves, or both" (p. vi). But, the authors assert that 
these decrees "are nonetheless antidemocratic" (p. vi).4 
I. Professor of Law and Director of Center for New York City Law, New York 
Law School. 
2. Professor of Law, New York City Law School. 
3. Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University 
Law Center. 
4. Despite their focus on judicial enforcement of federal statutes, Sandler and 
Schoenbrod occasionally refer to litigation based on the Constitution, which adds confu-
sion to the argument. They have a chapter on the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 
which was directed primarily at litigation aimed at enforcing the Eighth Amendment's 
ban on cruel and unusual punishment. (Curiously, the chapter frames the story of the 
PLRA around a truly minor provision requiring federal courts to allow state officials to 
189 
190 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 20:189 
Sandler and Schoenbrod claim to speak on behalf of democ-
racy in criticizing judges in these cases, and that's where the con-
fusion enters. You can get into complicated discussions of the 
democratic origins of constitutional mandates when dealing with 
decrees purporting to enforce such mandates. But there's noth-
ing complicated about the democratic pedigree of federal stat-
utes. Assume for the moment that judges have faithfully inter-
preted the statutes (Sandler and Schoenbrod seem to think they 
have). Then, the judicial decrees do no more than pit the expres-
sion of one democratically responsible body- Congress (and the 
President)- against some others-governors and state legisla-
tures, mayors and city councils. You can't get any purchase from 
democratic theory on how that sort of conflict should be re-
solved. According to Sandler and Schoenbrod, "With the su-
preme legislature in the land positively commandinf courts to 
lead the way, many judges marched forward" (p. 30). The ques-
tion is irresistible: Would the pro-democratic thing be for judges 
to refuse to comply with Congress's commands?6 
What's even more confusing is that Sandler and Schoen-
brod, apparently striving for a larger audience than most aca-
demic books reach, sprinkle their argument with examples that 
quite frequently don't make the point they say they're making.7 
intervene in prison litigation. I suspect that Sandler and Schoenbrod framed the story this 
way because someone told them that a book aimed at a non-specialist audience has to 
have good anecdotes, and the actors in the story they tell are a moderately interesting 
cast.) 
5. The confusion pervades the book. So, for example, Sandler and Schoenbrod 
write, "When judges impose such decrees, it is the voters who lose. They lose the ability 
to hold elected officials accountable for the performance of governmental institutions" 
(p. 9). But, voters still have the power to hold members of Congress accountable for the 
statutes on which the judges relied, and to hold mayors and members of city councils ac-
countable for accepting consent decrees. See also p. 154 ("The problem begins with Con-
gress."). 
6. The most promising theoretical perspective available here is one drawn from 
federalism and an account of constitutional limits on national power. But, again putting 
aside the problem that judicial enforcement of such limits raises the protean issues of 
democratic legitimacy that Sandler and Schoenbrod try to avoid by focusing on statutes, 
the fact of the matter is that there's no serious constitutional challenge (yet) available 
against the statutes Sandler and Schoenbrod discuss: They are all pretty straight-forward 
uses of Congress's power to regulate commerce among the several states or to condition 
the appropriation of federal funds on compliance with congressional requirements. 
7. For example, Sandler and Schoenbrod head one section, "Plaintiffs attorneys 
have the de facto power to veto modifications in the long-term plan" (p. 127). The anec-
dote in this section involves a consent decree stipulating procedures to be used to evict 
tenants from public housing. The housing authority sought to modify the decree so that it 
could evict crack cocaine dealers. Did the plaintiffs' lawyers have a veto over the modifi-
cation? "After three days of testimony, Judge Loretta A. Preska issued a fifty-five page 
opinion deciding that on balance it was permissible for the New Y ark City Housing Au-
thority to use the lawful, speedy procedures" (p. 129). Legislatures would like governors 
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Early in the book they describe their involvement in litigation to 
enforce the Clean Air Act. The story starts with an agreement 
between New York's Governor Nelson Rockefeller and New 
York City's Mayor John Lindsay to raise bridge tolls to finance 
improvements in mass transit. Note, right away, that here we 
have two elected politicians coming to an agreement, without 
any judicial involvement. But, Rockefeller's and Lindsay's suc-
cessors responded to the plan's unpopularity with drivers, and 
stalled in implementing the agreement. At that point, Sandler 
and Schoenbrod say, "Relying on Congress's declaration that 
citizens had a right to clean air, we decided that we would be the 
ones who would enforce that right in the New York courts" (p. 
29). They filed an action under the Clean Air Act, but the fed-
eral district judge refused to enter the injunction they sought. 
The court of appeals reversed. So, did the courts end up setting 
the fees charged on the bridges into New York? Not exactly. 
"Led by Daniel Patrick Moynihan in the Senate and Elizabeth 
Holtzman in the House, Congress outlawed both our lawsuit and 
Governor Rockefeller's decision favoring tolls" (p. 30). How this 
is supposed to demonstrate the evils of "democracy by decree" 
escapes me.8 As far as I can tell from Sandler and Schoenbrod's 
account, there never was even a decree entered, much less any 
enforcement action taken.9 
and presidents to have veto powers that effective. (Perhaps the problem is that the Hous-
ing Authority couldn't impose the new rules directly, but had to go through a court hear-
ing, as Sandler and Schoenbrod suggest in writing, "While this litigation continued, the 
tenants ... lived with the danger and intimidation of drug dealers next door" (p. 129). To 
evaluate the cogency of this concern, we would have to know something about the ad-
ministrative processes in New York, and about the politics of administrative rule-change. 
My guess is that the Housing Authority probably would have been able to impose the 
new rules somewhat more rapidly than actually occurred, but not instantaneously.) 
8. Sandler and Schoenbrod earlier outline the structures of politics that, they be-
lieve, lead state and local officials to fail when they oppose federal mandates: 
Advocates for the new initiative emphasize benefits and hide costs. State and 
local officials cannot easily oppose new federal programs aimed at helping con-
stituents, and may even be co-opted into supporting a mandate in order to get a 
larger share of federal funds. Even when some oppose mandates, they have lit-
tle success because the price of mandates is paid by everyone and therefore is 
the particular concern of no one (p. 24). 
The stories Sandler and Schoenbrod recount systematically undercut the theory on 
which they rely, leading me to wonder whether the theory is right. 
9. I should note the following argument, made, as far as I can tell, nowhere in 
Sandler and Schoenbrod's book: The New York Clean Air Act story does demonstrate 
the evils of democracy by decree, because the mere possibility that a decree would be 
entered forced New York's delegation in Congress to use some of their political chits to 
secure legislation, thereby depriving them of the chance to use those chits on some other 
issue of interest to their constituents. That argument is better than any Sandler and 
Schoenbrod offer, but, because it deals with changes on the margin of the politically pos-
Sible, the argument could not support the level of vitriol Sandler and Schoenbrod direct 
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Sandler and Schoenbrod do sketch-or perhaps better, hint 
at-two more substantial arguments about judicial enforcement 
of congressional statutes, but they develop neither in sufficient 
detail. First, they sometimes direct their ire at Congress for en-
acting the statutes they describe. 1° Fair enough, but hardly com-
patible with their simple-minded criticisms of judges for displac-
ing democracy. Second, and more important, Sandler and 
Schoenbrod periodically acknowledge that the processes bound 
up with judicial enforcement of statutory requirements are, at 
bottom, political processes. As they put it, "Consent decrees 
transfer power not from politicians to a judge but from one po-
litical process to another" (p. 7). I would think, then, that the in-
teresting question is how one political process compares to the 
other, in terms of democratic accountability and policy effec-
tiveness. Sandler and Schoenbrod sketch the political process in-
volving courts, but say almost nothing, at least directly, about the 
alternative 11 - and, again, their stories about litigation suggest 
pretty strongly that the two political processes are not as differ-
ent as Sandler and Schoenbrod appear to believe.12 
Judges enforcing statutory requirements are, as Sandler and 
Schoenbrod say, marching to Congress's command. We can't 
fairly fault them for acting against democratic norms when they 
do so-unless, somehow, Congress's actions are inconsistent 
with democratic norms. The obvious thing to say here is that the 
problem is one of excessive delegation of authority, the topic of 
Schoenbrod's prior book.13 Sandler and Schoenbrod sketch some 
standard, public-choicy arguments explaining why Congress 
might want to delegate authority. They point out that the stat-
(unjustifiably) against courts. (Note that the villain in this story is Congress, which cre-
ates the possibility of litigation, not the courts, who never have to do anything for the 
adverse political consequences to flow.) 
10. For example, Sandler and Schoenbrod write, "The perversion of court enforce-
ment from rights enforcement to policy imposition is the fault ... of Congress" (pp. 139-
40). 
11. Perhaps Sandler and Schoenbrod believe that merely labeling a process associ-
ated with the courts as political is sufficient to discredit it, no matter what the alternative 
political process is. This may do in the popular press, and perhaps has some analytic bite 
in connection with judicial enforcement of constitutional rights, but it is inadequate in a 
serious academic analysis. 
12. I use this qualified formulation because Sandler and Schoenbrod do not provide 
anything approaching a full account of their understanding of the alternative political 
process. 
13. DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS 
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993). Sandler and Schoenbrod are con-
cerned with delegation to courts rather than to administrative agencies, but the associ-
ated problem of democratic responsibility for actual policymaking is the same whether 
the assignee of policymaking authority is an administrative agency or a court. 
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utes they discuss involve what they call "soft rights," which they 
define as imposing "aspirational" obligations (p. 103). Why does 
Congress enact soft rights? Most of the time, Sandler and 
Schoenbrod say that Congress does so because such rights are 
popular. So, for example, they write: 
In enacting a statutory right for children with disabilities to 
receive an appropriate education, Congress emphasized the 
image of deaf, blind, and wheelchair-bound children kept out 
of the school building or, even more pathetically, simply de-
nied an education. We can all agree that such neglect is mor-
ally wrong (pp. 103-04). 
But, of course, you can't get any mileage out of a democracy-
based criticism of legislation on the ground that such legislation 
is popular. Sandler and Schoenbrod continue by noting, "The 
right that Congress wrote into the fine print of the act ... went 
far beyond the image that lent poignancy to the campaign to 
create the right" (p. 104). The real question, then, is why Con-
gress did so. 
Part of the answer, surely, is ease of drafting: Congress en-
acts a broadly worded statute to ensure that the people it really 
wants to benefit from the aspirational right will actually receive 
it. Another part of the answer is interest-group pressure: Once 
an issue is ripe for legislative treatment, interest groups with re-
lated issues try to get a sympathetic legislator to attach a provi-
sion addressing their issues. Sandler and Schoenbrod provide a 
third component of the answer: "Politicians are regularly 
tempted to sacrifice the long-term public interest for their own 
short-run private political gain" (p. 171). 
The interest-group and short-term perspective answers 
identify problems now commonly described as agency problems. 
That is, the politicians the people elect are not faithful represen-
tatives of their constituents' interests. I'm not entirely per-
suaded, though, that Congress enacts soft rights because of 
agency problems. The reason is that voters no less than politi-
cians overlook long-term costs in pursuit of apparent short-run 
benefits-which raises some conceptual questions about defining 
the public interest with reference to the long-term. I have in 
mind here recent referenda in Florida and California. The peo-
ple of Florida approved a referendum dictating that class sizes in 
public schools be reduced, without adopting any provision deal-
ing with financing the new policy. The people of California ap-
proved a referendum requiring the establishment of a system of 
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after-school programs, again without providing funds for the 
new programs.14 It seems that the people themselves have a 
short-run perspective. This suggests that politicians who pursue 
short-run goals while disregarding long-run costs may well be 
faithful servants of a shortsighted public. Whatever problems 
this causes, it isn't that the politicians are acting in a manner in-
compatible with democracy, as the term is usually understood. 
There's an additional problem in criticizing legislation creat-
ing soft rights as antidemocratic. What can we do about it? The 
obvious remedies are technocratic governance and judicial en-
forcement of a nondelegation doctrine, but these themselves 
raise questions of democratic accountability. 
As to technocracy: Sandler and Schoenbrod sometimes hint 
that one problem with judicial enforcement of statutory re-
quirements is that such decrees displace the budget decisions 
made by elected officials, thereby interfering with the elected of-
ficials' ability to develop programs advancing the public interest 
within limited budgets. For example, they summarize one criti-
cism of one of the cases they study in this way: "The court set 
about to reform a single program in a vast educational struc-
ture-a fool's errand because special education could not be re-
formed without reforming the entire system" (p. 92). This 
sounds like Sandler and Schoenbrod seek what might be called 
comprehensive rationality in public policy. That certainly would 
address some of the problems Sandler and Schoenbrod identify, 
and technocrats usually favor comprehensive rationality. But, 
Sandler and Schoenbrod sometimes don't like technocrats ei-
ther: "democracy by decree shifts attention from the concerns of 
local voters to the preoccupations of technocrats. The techno-
crats engage in a prolonged process to specify comprehensive, 
universally applicable solutions to policy problems" (pp. 158-59). 
And their dislike is appropriate, at least from the perspective of 
the kind of democratic theory to which Sandler and Schoenbrod 
say they are committed: The technocratic quest for comprehen-
sive policy rationality is in serious tension with the populist de-
mocratic concerns on which Sandler and Schoenbrod seem to fo-
cus (referenda are democratic politics in action directly, after 
all). 
As to judicial enforcement of a nondelegation doctrine: 
Well, that, obviously, replaces one problem (which is not really a 
14. Political observers generally saw the referendum as a trial run for Arnold 
Schwarzenegger's gubernatorial candidacy. 
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problem of lack of democratic accountability) with another 
(which is). Maybe the best one could do is work within a frame-
work of statutory interpretation: Judges should be careful about 
construing statutes to create soft rights. 15 But, perhaps because 
they agree that the federal judges they criticize are doing what 
Congress really wanted, Sandler and Schoenbrod offer a weaker 
set of prescriptions, amounting to a catalogue of rules courts 
should apply in the course of enforcing soft rights (pp. 193-221). 
The more important, but underdeveloped, argument is that 
judicial enforcement of statutory requirements is a political 
process that displaces an alternative political process. As is too 
frequent in the book, the authors use a phrase they think is pejo-
rative-here, "the controlling group"-to label the process. We 
can begin to understand what's at stake by picking apart what 
they have to say about the controlling group, and then by com-
paring the political process they describe to the alternative. 
For Sandler and Schoenbrod, the controlling group is "a bu-
reaucracy consisting of attorneys for the parties, the functionar-
ies and experts they bring into the negotiating room, and various 
court-appointed officials such as special masters" (p. 118). The 
authors' most interesting comments deal with the actions of de-
fendants in the litigation they describe. I enumerate some of 
their comments, coupling them with some critical observations. 
(1) Sandler and Schoenbrod criticize defendants for agree-
ing to settle cases, arguing that "[ o ]fficials can protect and ex-
pand budgets and programs . . . [and] gain protection against 
even more stringent laws and rules" (p. 122). A signal of the au-
thors' analytic confusion is their description of this behavior as 
"trump[ing] political bodies" (p. 122), when, of course, the de-
fendants are themselves political. 16 
15. So, for example, they might construe aspirational statutes not to create enforce-
able rights. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) 
(holding that the federal Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act did 
not create enforceable rights); Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997) (holding that 
Title IV-D of the Social Security Act does not create a private right to enforce substan-
tial state compliance with its provisions). Sandler and Schoenbrod acknowledge that 
stated Supreme Court doctrine is far less supportive of the processes they criticize than 
one might think, but point to a "split between Supreme Court principles and lower court 
practice" (p. 162) to explain why the processes persist. I think they are right in identifying 
such a split, but they don't offer much in the way of an explanation of its origins. They 
say that the Court "has yet to put in place an effective mechanism for enforcing its own 
rules" (p. 165), and suggest that appellate review is inadequate because too few cases are 
appealed (p. 167). 
16. Sometimes Sandler and Schoenbrod describe defendants as civil servants and 
bureaucrats, but equally often they assert, correctly, that the defendants are mayors and 
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(2) According to Sandler and Schoenbrod, "Mayors and 
governors are afraid to direct their attorneys to move for termi-
nation for fear of stimulating plaintiffs to launch a critique of 
their administration-one that could be highly publicized ... " 
(p. 131). But, as Sandler and Schoenbrod also point out, plain-
tiffs are part of a network of interest groups, and policy changes 
unconnected to litigation can lead to highly publicized critiques 
as well. Consider, for example, the widely publicized stories 
about the ineptitude of Florida's department of children's wel-
fare, which lost track of a number of children under the depart-
ment's nominal supervision. So, again, Sandler and Schoenbrod 
haven't identified something that distinguishes the political 
process of judicial enforcement from the alternative political 
process. 
(3) Sandler and Schoenbrod write, "Lower-level officials 
from the agency being sued who chafe at ordinary bureaucratic 
restrictions gain valuable purchase on policy and budgets" (p. 
131).17 This seems to me accurate. Still, a fair comparison of al-
ternative policy processes would note the way in which lower-
level officials use leaks, contacts with the press, and contacts 
with interest groups to achieve some purchase on policy and 
budgets. 
( 4) The authors describe the fact that "legislative policy 
judgments [must] be made in the open" as one "constitutional 
safeguard" of democratic governance, and say that "[t]he con-
trolling group prefers to make public policy behind closed 
doors" (p. 156). But, backroom deals are commonplace in the 
ordinary legislative process too. Deals are hammered out behind 
closed doors and ratified in public-just as occurs in the judicial 
proceedings Sandler and Schoenbrod discuss. 
(5) Sandler and Schoenbrod say that "voters lose the ability 
to communicate with government" in the political process of ju-
dicial enforcement (p. 157). They say that this sort of litigation 
"shifts power from the village council, city hall, and statehouse 
to bureaucracies in Washington and the courtroom" (p. 158). 
members of city councils. I understand how one might think that civil servants might 
"trump" political bodies, although one would want a much better developed account of 
the indirect responsibility civil servants have to political bodies before one could really 
accept this criticism. I simply don't understand, though, how decisions by mayors and city 
councils "trump" political bodies, that is, themselves. 
17. See also p. 156 ("Plaintiffs' and defendants' representatives ... have a mutual 
interest in building up the budget and power of the government agency that is the target 
of the lawsuit."). 
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Washington bureaucracies are hard to approach without a "lob-
bying/litigating operation in Washington," and "(i]nfluencing 
judges requires intervening in a lawsuit" (p. 158). The claim 
about Washington bureaucracies is particularly puzzling, be-
cause the authors' focus is not on regulatory requirements 
adopted by federal agencies and enforced by the courts, but on 
the statutes underlying those regulatory requirements. Washing-
ton bureaucrats have nothing to do with enacting those stat-
utes.18 Maybe ordinary voters can't influence their elected repre-
sentatives without some interest group support, but that claim 
opens up a much larger critique of representative democracy 
than Sandler and Schoenbrod develop. And, regarding judges, I 
don't understand why the only way ordinary voters can influence 
judges is through intervention. The more obvious method, I 
would have thought, is to contact their elected representatives-
mayors, members of city councils, state legislators and gover-
nors- to affect the positions taken in litigation. 
Sandler and Schoenbrod feature several case studies in their 
account. Examining two indicates the problems that arise when 
critics look at one political process without considering the al-
ternative.19 Sandler and Schoenbrod invite us to "[c]onsider gov-
ernment by decree from the perspective of Commissioner Nicho-
las Scoppetta" (p. 144), the administrator of New York's child 
welfare agency from 1996 to 2001, responsible for the city's fos-
ter care and protective services programs. After a public scan-
dal-not associated, as Sandler and Schoenbrod tell the tale,20 
with any judicial enforcement proceedings-Mayor Rudolph 
Giuliani appointed Scoppetta to head a new agency reporting di-
rectly to the mayor. Scoppetta developed a plan to reduce indi-
vidual caseworkers' caseloads, improve training and supervision, 
and the like. Shortly before Scoppetta took his new job, though, 
a lawsuit had been filed seeking close judicial supervision of New 
York's child welfare system, invoking constitutional and statu-
tory rights. Sandler and Schoenbrod's general story about judi-
cial enforcement leads them to assert, "Defendants in such a 
case would normally consent to a decree that imposed a detailed, 
long-term plan on the disputed governmental program," but 
18. Again, one could develop a fancy theory about how bureaucrats generate stat· 
utes, but there's nothing approaching such a theory in this book. 
19. For strenuous and astute criticism of one-institution analyses and advocacy of 
full institutional comparisons, see NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECf ALTERNATIVES: 
CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994). 
20. Here I rely entirely on the authors' account of the events. 
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Scoppetta "adamantly refused to cede control" (p. 146). After 
noting this, Sandler and Schoenbrod go into the hypothetical 
universe in which a settlement was reached, making the plain-
tiffs' lawyers "co-commissioners in fact," leading to "clashes of 
ego and ... friction and conflict," and more (p. 147). 
But, astonishingly to anyone who thought that Sandler and 
Schoenbrod were providing a case study of the problems of judi-
cial enforcement of statutory requirements, nothing of the sort 
happened. Scoppetta was indeed under an earlier decree requir-
ing that evaluations of foster care placements be completed 
within thirty days. He believed that an adequate evaluation 
could be done in three days. "It took Scoppetta ten months of 
painful and sometimes bitter negotiations to persuade plaintiffs' 
attorneys to approve the change" (p. 147). Sandler and Schoen-
brod observe that the earlier decree gave Scoppetta cover, and 
that "[i]t took personal leadership to seek change in an institu-
tion where blame avoidance is too often job number one" (p. 
148). I interrupt the narrative here to make three points. First, 
this particular requirement has nothing to do with the broader 
lawsuit brought just before Scoppetta took office, so there's a 
narrative lurch in Sandler and Schoenbrod's presentation. Sec-
ond, I wonder how long it would have taken Scoppetta to impose 
the new rule even without the overhanging decree. Bureaucra-
cies move slowly,21 and ten months doesn't seem like that long a 
time to me for an important policy change to be put in place 
even without any lawsuit hanging over your head. Interest 
groups would pay attention to new programs, and Scoppetta 
might well have had to justify his new plans in public hearings 
before some city council committee, and in the press. Again, 
Sandler and Schoenbrod's inattention to the alternative political 
processes makes it impossible to determine whether their criti-
cism of the judicial enforcement process has any cogency. And, 
third, and perhaps most obvious, the story they tell contradicts 
their account of judicial enforcement generally. Instead of a 
spineless bureaucrat or one who welcomes litigation as a way of 
increasing his clout within the government, we have a leader. 
And, once more, any sensible evaluation of alternative processes 
21. To quote Harry Truman on what Truman believed to be Dwight Eisenhower's 
mistaken inferences from Eisenhower's military experience, "He'll sit here ... and he'll 
say, 'Do this! Do that!' And nothing will happen. Poor Ike-it won't be a bit like the 
Army. He'll find it very frustrating." RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER 9 
(1960). 
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would have to tell us how often bureaucracies have leaders, and 
how often they don't. 
After several more paragraphs fulminating about democ-
racy by decree, entirely disconnected from the narrative that 
seems to be presented as a way of supporting the criticisms, 
Sandler and Schoenbrod return to Commissioner Scoppetta, 
who, it turns out, "successfully negotiated a consent order that 
left full control of the remedy in his and the agency's hands as 
long as the agency in good faith advanced its own remedial plan" 
(p. 149). The judge supervising the case noted that it was 
unlikely that any court order could improve on the plan Scop-
petta developed, and the decree provided for its own termina-
tion in two years if the agency "continued to demonstrate good 
faith" (p. 149), which it did. 
The sentence that immediately follows this narrative is: 
"That court decrees interfere with the operation of government 
is, of course, not the whole story" (p. 149). Indeed, according to 
this case study, the proposition that court decrees interfere with 
the operation of government isn't even part of the story. What 
Sandler and Schoenbrod think they have established with this 
case study remains a mystery. 
About one-fourth of the book deals with a single case study, 
involving special education programs in New York City. Here I 
direct attention to only some parts of the story Sandler and 
Schoenbrod relate. The story begins with Congress's enactment 
of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act in 1975. By 
1978 the city was in "blatant violation" (p. 53) of the federal 
statute, and faced enforcement litigation. After Mayor Edward 
Koch appointed Frank Macchiarola chancellor of the city's 
schools in that year, Macchiarola searched for a permanent di-
rector of special education. In 1979 Macchiarola hired one of the 
nation's leading experts on special education, Jerry Gross. 
Within two months, Gross proposed "a radical new approach" 
(p. 59) to special education, allowing placement decisions to be 
made in local schools rather than by a central staff. According to 
Sandler and Schoenbrod, the plaintiffs in the pending litigation 
"embraced" the plan (p. 60)-which, note, had been developed 
by a professional on the chancellor's staff, hardly an outsider or 
someone unaccountable to the political process. The school 
board adopted Gross's plan, but refrained from agreeing to write 
it into a consent decree. The federal judge supervising the law-
suit adopted Gross's plan as well, ordering the school board to 
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come up with concrete plans "that would breath life into the 
Gross Program" (p. 62). 
To this point, it's hard to see anything special about the 
court's intervention. Macchiarola, a mayoral appointee, hired a 
subordinate to develop a plan, which the court accepted. Sandler 
and Schoenbrod don't like what the court did, though, because it 
"shifted power dramatically" (p. 61) by giving power to the con-
trolling group, who benefited "because of their command of the 
arcane terms of the decree and their ability to haul the board of 
education before the special master and the judge" (p. 62). Pause 
for a moment here and reflect on the empowerment occasioned 
by mastery of "arcane terms." The politically accountable offi-
cials who developed and approved the plan surely had the same, 
or even more, mastery of those terms than the plaintiffs' lawyers. 
Not much changed as the controlling group developed the 
detailed plans. The plans by their terms had short deadlines, 
which no one ever thought realistic and which were never met. 
According to Sandler and Schoenbrod, "A major dispute 
erupted over 'preventive services' ... to prevent children from 
needing special education" (p. 64). Although at first city officials 
agreed to include such services, they reconsidered as the cost 
implications became clear. The special master recommended 
that preventive services be provided. The judge, in Sandler and 
Schoenbrod's terms, "split the difference," asserting that the 
consent decree might indeed require the board to provide pre-
ventive services, but held "that the board should not be com-
pelled to provide preventive services until its other major obliga-
tions were carried out" (p. 66). This outcome seems to me an 
essentially complete victory for the school board and its fiscal 
concerns, coupled with a meaningless sop to plaintiffs that, if the 
world ever changes dramatically, they might actually get some 
preventive services. Yet, Sandler and Schoenbrod seem to think 
that this outcome somehow demonstrates that judicial enforce-
ment proceedings displace political responsibility. 
Sandler and Schoenbrod go through much more detail on 
the special education litigation. They conclude that "no govern-
mental official or institution has taken responsibility for what 
happened" (p. 94). That seems untrue, at least in connection 
with the initial Gross Plan. There Chancellor Macchiarola pretty 
clearly did take responsibility. And, Sandler and Schoenbrod 
add, school "[b]oard officials alternately used and attacked [the 
litigation] process, but overall stayed with it" (p. 95). The au-
thors think that there's something wrong with going along to 
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keep "the court off its back" (p. 95), and maybe there is. But, 
there's no problem of democratic responsibility here. If New 
York's people, or its mayor, didn't like it when the board of edu-
cation "stayed with" the decree instead of resisting it at every 
point, the people and the mayor had the tools to rein the board 
of education in. 
Perhaps Sandler and Schoenbrod mean that no one took re-
sponsibility for the overall outcome at the end of the day. Here a 
point that Sandler and Schoenbrod mention takes on greater 
significance: New York City had nine school chancellors over the 
course of the litigation. The chancellors didn't leave because 
they couldn't handle the special education litigation; they re-
signed, or were fired, because they couldn't manage New York's 
schools. The turmoil in the city's special education programs, 
that is, seems more a characteristic of the city's schools than 
something fairly attributable to judicial enforcement of the fed-
eral statute. Put another way, chances are pretty good that the 
city's special education programs would be in no better shape 
had special education been addressed by the board of education 
or the school chancellor entirely free from judicial supervision. 
The difficulty with Sandler and Schoenbrod's argument can 
be summarized by quoting and then rewriting their own sum-
mary of the problems they find in judicial enforcement of statu-
tory requirements. Here is their summary: 
Democracy by decree, in the end, privileges those groups 
and interests that have the tight organizations and sophistica-
tion needed to get Congress to pass a federal statute that cre-
ates rights, and then to follow up with litigation leading to a 
decree enforcing that right. The great mass of less organized 
and sophisticated interests and the public at large get no seats 
at this judicial managed, invitation-only table of government. 
Democracy by decree, which is justified by opening up gov-
ernment to those who have been disenfranchised, ends up 
disenfranchising others- the very sorts of people that the 
public interest bar claims to represent (p. 158). 
Here's the rewrite: 
Legislation and administrative rule-making, in the end, privi-
lege those groups and interests that have the tight organiza-
tions and sophistication needed to get Congress to pass a fed-
eral statute that creates rights, and then to follow up with 
pressure on administrators to create rules enforcing those 
rights. The great mass of less organized and sophisticated in-
terests and the public at large get no seats at this invitation-
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only table of government. Legislation and administrative 
rulemaking, which is justified as government by the people, 
ends up disenfranchising some of the people. 
The rewrite seems to me about as accurate as the original. If 
it is, what Sandler and Schoenbrod are concerned with is not 
really "democracy by decree," but with modern government. 
But, it would take a very different book than the one they have 
written to develop a critique of modern government. 
Early in the book Sandler and Schoenbrod comment that 
proponents of judicial enforcement "conclude that they cannot 
show that decrees actually do more good than harm because the 
criteria by which such a determination could be made have not 
been established" (p. 6).22 But, a decent study of two political 
processes would have to compare the results achieved under one 
with those achieved under the other. If you can't tell when a ju-
dicial decree has accomplished anything, maybe you can't tell 
when legislation or administrative action has either. I am re-
minded here of Mark Graber's astute comment on the subtitle of 
Gerald Rosenberg's highly regarded study The Hollow Hope: 
Can Courts Bring About Social Change?23 Graber has suggested 
that someone ought to write a book called The Hollow Hope: 
Can Legislatures Bring About Social Change? His point is that in 
both cases the answer is probably, "Sometimes yes, sometimes 
no." The same might be said about judicial and administrative 
enforcement of aspirationallegislation. Unfortunately, we can't 
begin to answer the right question after reading Sandler and 
Schoenbrod because they don't ask it.24 
22. They cite here MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL 
POLICY -MAKING A I'D THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S 
PRISONS (1998), which deals mostly with constitutional litigation. See note 2 supra (dis-
cussing the authors' failure to keep the argument focused on judicial enforcement of 
statutory requirements). 
23. Gerald Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? 
(1991). 
24. Sandler and Schoenbrod's general failure to compare the political process asso-
ciated with judicial enforcement of statutory requirements with the political process as-
sociated with legislative and administrative enforcement of those requirements-or of 
the more general aspirational policies those requirements embody-produces some more 
discrete failures. For example, Sandler and Schoenbrod observe that judicial enforce-
ment proceedings "inevitably lead[ J to an emphasis on the quantifiable dimensions of 
the defendant's mission and deemphasize[ ] the rest" (p. 148). So, for example, enforce-
ment proceedings in the disability-education case they study focused on "deadlines hit, 
psychologists hired, evaluations performed, placements made", because these "surro-
gates" for educational quality "were all that the courts could measure" (p. 159). A study 
that really compared political processes might ask whether the legislative and administra-
tive processes use non-quantitative measures of educational quality, or better surrogates. 
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None of this is to say that there are no problems with any 
judicial decrees in cases involving aspirational statutes. Of 
course there are-sometimes. The problems go to policy ration-
ality and to Congress's democratic legitimacy. There are prob-
lems of policy rationality and democratic legitimacy as well in 
the formulation and implementation of government procure-
ment policy, in Medicare, in ordinary education programs not 
under judicial decree, and in just about every other area of pol-
icy. Once we abandon the delusion that problems of policy ra-
tionality and democratic legitimacy are distinctive to judicial en-
forcement of statutory requirements, we're going to need careful 
assessments of the legitimacy and capacity of different institu-
tions of governance-of different political processes- to address 
a range of policy issues. Focusing solely on the problems associ-
ated with some judicial enforcement proceedings does not ad-
vance the real inquiry. 
I'm pretty sure that there's an interesting and well-reasoned 
book to be written about the judicial role in enforcing statutory 
requirements. This isn't it. 
The use of school-wide test scores in the recently enacted federal education legislation 
suggests that the differences between the judicial and the legislative processes may be 
small. 
